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 This study examines whether personally tax aggressive executives pursue corporate 
philanthropy. Relative to a control group, corporate philanthropy increases by 3.0 percent, on 
average, following personal tax aggression events by executives. Put another way, every $1 of 
personal tax gain by executives is associated with $2.01 of corporate resources spent on 
corporate philanthropy. Further analyses suggest that the positive association between corporate 
philanthropy and executive-level tax aggression is consistent with a behavioral theory. In an 
environment where a social norm for paying a “fair share” of taxes exists, personally tax 
aggressive executives might experience disutility from violating the social norm, leading them to 
engage in compensatory activities to mitigate disutility. Consistent with this idea, personally tax 
aggressive executives pursue greater corporate philanthropy, presumably to “cleanse” themselves 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Aggressive tax planning raises the cost of tax collection, distorts the distribution of the 
tax burden, and erodes government revenue (Slemrod and Bakija 2017; Slemrod 2018).1 Because 
such behavior violates the social norm for equity in tax payments (Luttmer and Singhal 2014), 
numerous interest groups (e.g., Americans for Tax Fairness) pressure both individuals and large 
corporations to “pay their fair share” of taxes. While such groups often claim that higher costs of 
tax collection and erosion of tax revenue reduces funding for Social Security, healthcare, 
education, and infrastructure, aggressive tax planning can partly increase funding for such social 
objectives if the tax-sheltered resources are channeled directly to the non-profit sector. 
Therefore, in this study, I examine the association between funding for social objectives and 
aggressive tax planning using data on corporate philanthropy and personal tax aggression by 
top corporate executives (i.e., Board Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operations 
Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and President). I then test whether two competing behavioral 
explanations drive any observed association. 
In an environment where the social norm for equity in tax payments is salient, individuals 
exhibiting tax aggression could have preferences for activities, such as donations to charities, that 
“undo” the negative effect of violating the social norm on their utility.2 Thus, some individuals 
could be aggressive in tax planning while being altruistic, resulting in a positive relation between 
funding for social goods and aggressive tax planning. However, individual belief or corporate 
 
1 Tax aggressiveness is defined as the use of tax planning strategies with “weak legal support” (Lisowsky, Robinson, 
and Schmidt 2013, 590) that “push the envelope of tax law” (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, 137). See Chapter 2.2 for 
details. 
2 See Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) for more on disutility that 
arises as a result of misbehaving. Also see Zhong and Liljenquist (2006); Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009); and 
Gneezy, Imas, and Madarasz (2014) for studies on the relation between misbehavior and prosocial behavior. 
2 
 
attitude could also give rise to the positive relation. For example, when asked about raising the 
top marginal tax rate to 70 percent at the 2019 World Economic Forum, the Chief Executive 
Officer of Dell Technologies stated that having established a private foundation, he felt “much 
more comfortable” in the private foundation’s ability to allocate resources for funding social 
objectives than in the efficiency of the tax system.3 Individuals with such distrust in the 
efficiency of the tax system could choose to be tax aggressive while exhibiting a willingness to 
directly support social objectives. 
These two potential explanations for a positive relation between corporate philanthropy 
(funding for social objectives) and executive-level personal tax aggression (aggressive tax 
planning) stem from psychology and behavioral economics. Specifically, the first explanation is 
often referred to as “moral cleansing” in psychology (Zhong and Liljenquist 2006) or 
“conscience accounting” in behavioral economics (Gneezy et al. 2014). The idea is grounded in 
the assumption that there are costs associated with the act of misbehaving, contrary to some 
economic models that do not specify disutility in the act of misbehaving. For example, in 
Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) personal tax evasion model, the cost of personal tax evasion is a 
function of the probability of detection and the penalty rate that must be paid once detected, 
while the disutility associated with the act of tax evasion is ignored.4 Incorporating the cost of 
misbehaving, the moral cleansing hypothesis and conscience accounting model suggest that 
individuals will engage in prosocial activities to offset the disutility of misbehaving. 
The second explanation is referred to as “individual beliefs,” and there is a growing 
literature on how managerial beliefs, observed characteristics, and lifetime experiences influence 
 
3 See “Dell CEO Joins Davos Debate on 70% Tax Rate: ‘Not Supportive’,” 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-23/dell-ceo-joins-davos-debate-on-70-tax-rate-not-supportive.  
4 Discussed in Gneezy et al. (2014), disutility emerges as a result of violating an individual’s internalized norm 
and/or failing to meet others’ expectations. 
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corporate-level decisions that managers make (Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker 2012; Chyz 
2013; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2011; Law and Mills 2017; Malmendier 2018). Individual 
managers may hold beliefs and preferences with respect to their personal tax planning, corporate 
tax planning, and philanthropic activities. For example, managers could question the 
government’s ability to efficiently distribute resources gathered through its tax system. This 
skepticism in the efficiency of the tax system could, in turn, lead managers to be aggressive with 
their personal and corporate tax planning and to inject some of the tax-sheltered resources to the 
non-profit sector with either their own resources or corporate philanthropy, or both. 
To begin, I first examine whether corporate philanthropy is increasing in executive-level 
personal tax aggression. I obtain firm-level philanthropic activities panel data gathered by the 
Foundation Center. This nonprofit organization collects information on corporate philanthropy 
from both the grant-making corporations and public records such as IRS filings (e.g., Form 990-
PF).5  The Center gathers grant-level information on both grants made by (1) corporate-
sponsored foundations and (2) corporate giving programs, which are accessible through its 
online directory, Foundation Directory Online (FDO). 
I then identify executives’ personal tax aggressiveness by focusing on executives’ 
backdating of stock option exercises to days with relatively low stock prices. Backdating option 
exercises is the act of marking an option exercise transaction to a date that precedes the actual 
exercise date. Since backdating option exercises to obtain tax savings is accomplished through 
transactions between executives and their firms and is unlikely to involve third parties (e.g., 
broker), stock option exercise backdating can provide desired tax savings to executives with 
limited third-party monitoring of executives’ tax aggressiveness. Prior research validates this 
 




approach as a proxy for executive-level personal tax aggression (Cicero 2009; Dhaliwal, 
Erickson, and Heitzman 2009; Chyz 2013; Biggerstaff, Cicero, and Puckett 2015). More 
specifically, using information on corporate insider’s stock and option transactions provided by 
the Thomson Financial Insider Filing Database, I flag an option exercise transaction as a 
“suspect” exercise if stock prices around the option exercise are consistent with manipulating the 
exercise date to under-report ordinary taxable income. I label executives that initiate a suspect 
exercise as a “suspect executive.”6 
Using a difference-in-differences design that exploits multiple suspect exercise events, I 
find that corporate philanthropy increases by 3.0 percent, on average, after suspect exercise 
events. This finding is relative to corporate philanthropy of firms not exposed to suspect exercise 
events. A 3.0 percent increase in corporate philanthropy corresponds to $21,900 increase in cash 
outlays. While this dollar amount may seem immaterial, it is indeed economically significant 
when compared to the average size of philanthropic grants (between $21,300 and $21,700) by 
foundations with assets of more than $10 million in 2016.7 In addition to examining the intensive 
margin response to suspect exercise events, I conduct an analysis for the extensive margin 
response with an indicator variable for positive corporate philanthropy. The extensive margin 
analysis is important for understanding whether the above finding is coming from either the 
initiation of corporate philanthropic practices or from the increase in the amount of corporate 
philanthropy by already existing corporate philanthropy programs. I fail to find a statistically 
significant extensive margin response to suspect exercise events. Therefore, the positive 
association between corporate philanthropy and executive-level personal tax aggression seems to 
 
6 I review the mechanics of using stock option exercise backdating to make personal tax gains and legal implications 
of backdating practices in Chapter 3.1.1. 




be driven by the increase in philanthropic activities by firms that already had ongoing 
philanthropic practices. 
Next, I investigate whether the moral cleansing or individual beliefs explanation is more 
or less descriptive of the observed positive relation. Specifically, I consider the heterogeneity in 
the effect of corporate executives’ personal tax aggressiveness on corporate philanthropy. If 
moral cleansing is the leading explanation for my results, I expect to see the positive relation 
between corporate philanthropy and executive-level personal tax aggression being moderated by 
corporate culture/norm. Under the moral cleansing hypothesis, misbehavior is defined as a 
behavior violating either an individual’s internalized norm or widely accepted social norm. Thus, 
the presence of multiple executives within the same firm engaging in suspect exercises (a proxy 
for corporate culture/norm) should decrease each executive’s moral burden from misbehaving. 
On the other hand, if managers’ individual beliefs with respect to the tax system’s lack of 
efficiency in distributing resources are the driver of my results, then I expect the opposite effect 
of corporate culture/norm on my results. The psychology literature on social norms suggests that 
individuals tend to behave in a manner similar to others around them (Asch and Guetzkow 1951). 
Hence, the positive relation between corporate philanthropy and executive-level personal tax 
aggression would only strengthen as the number of executives behaving in a similar manner with 
respect to their personal taxes within the same firm increases. 
I find that the positive association between corporate philanthropy and executive-level 
personal tax aggression is consistent with the moral cleansing explanation. Specifically, 
corporate philanthropy increases by 9.4 percent on average after suspect exercise events in firms 
where top management is more likely to have a norm for equity in tax payments (i.e., when just 
one of the top executives in the data are initiating suspect exercise(s)). A 9.4 percent increase in 
6 
 
corporate philanthropy corresponds to $68,620 increase in cash outlays. In relation to my 
estimates of average personal tax gains from suspect exercises, every dollar of tax gain by a 
personally tax aggressive executive is associated with $6.30 of corporate philanthropy. For firms 
with top management that is less likely to have a norm for equity in tax payments, I fail to find 
the statistically significant positive relation between executive-level personal tax aggressiveness 
and corporate philanthropy. These results suggest that social norms play an important role in 
shaping whether a behavior can give rise to disutility and that the hypothesized cleansing 
behavior should only manifest in a setting where an executive experiences disutility from 
violating the existing social norm. 
I perform two additional tests to examine the heterogeneity in the effect of executive-
level personal tax aggressiveness on corporate philanthropy. First, I examine whether corporate 
governance, proxied by the fraction of shares owned by institutional blockholders, moderates the 
main findings. I find that greater ownership by institutional blockholders reduces the effect of 
executive-level personal tax aggressiveness on corporate philanthropy, suggesting that greater 
external monitoring limits corporate philanthropy that likely only satisfies corporate executives’ 
demand/taste. 
Second, I examine the moderating role of industry-level competition. I find that the 
positive relation between corporate philanthropy and executive-level personal tax aggressiveness 
is increasing in industry-level competition (proxied by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)). This 
result suggests that the philanthropic activities of firms operating in highly competitive 
environments are used as a cleansing mechanism for suspect executives. Since corporate 
philanthropy may be seen as an advertising tool to increase customer loyalty (Navarro 1988) and 
advertising is a method to help differentiate products, increase product demand, and ultimately 
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enhance barriers to entry (Sutton 1991), the presence of greater competition may help suspect 
executives to “justify” the increase in corporate philanthropy as a positive NPV investment. 
These additional tests, along with my main results, are robust to controlling for corporate-level 
financial misbehavior, corporate-level tax avoidance, market-to-book, and unobservable time-
varying industry level factors that are found to be (or may be) correlated with both executive-
level personal tax aggressiveness and corporate philanthropy. 
Finally, I test whether firms that are exposed to suspect exercises not only increase the 
amount of corporate philanthropy (i.e., the size of grants) but also the number of grants that they 
make in the years following suspect exercises. The purpose of this test is to check whether the 
positive association between corporate philanthropy and executive-level personal tax aggression 
could partly be explained by the firms’ effort to manage their corporate reputation with 
philanthropic activities in anticipation of or in response to the discovery of option exercise 
backdating by either the regulators (e.g., Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC)) or media outlets. Option backdating scandals were highly 
publicized in the late 2000s, and, subsequently, backdating option exercises have come under 
greater scrutiny by the regulators. Under the assumption that corporate reputation management 
could be carried out through new and potentially highly publicized grants, examining whether 
my results are driven by the new grants would be informative in understanding whether there is a 
reputation management motive in corporate philanthropy. In my empirical tests, I fail to find a 
statistically significant new grant responses to suspect exercises. Overall, my findings 
collectively support the presence of moral cleansing for corporate executives who misbehave to 
make personal tax gains. 
8 
 
This study makes several contributions. First, it extends prior research investigating 
whether executives’ personal attributes and behaviors influence corporate policies. Some studies 
find that manager fixed effects provide explanatory power for corporate acquisition decisions, 
dividend policy, and tax avoidance (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 
2010). Others identify specific characteristics and behaviors of executives (such as 
overconfidence, military background, execution skills, personal leverage, and personal tax 
evasion) that are associated with corporate investment and financing policies, value, misconduct, 
and tax avoidance (Joulfaian 2000; Malmendier and Tate 2005; Bernile and Jarrell 2009; 
Malmendier et al. 2011; Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen 2012; Chyz 2013; Biggerstaff et al. 
2015; Law and Mills 2017). While studies on executive behavior document that individuals 
behave consistently across different decision-making settings (e.g., unethical behavior at 
personal level and financial misconduct of firms that misbehaving individuals manage), my study 
provides new insight that individuals can exhibit behavioral inconsistency (e.g., unethical 
behavior at personal level and prosocial behavior at corporate level). Second, my study 
contributes to a stream of research that views CSR programs as the manifestation of agency 
problems between managers and shareholders. That is, corporate philanthropy serves to promote 
managers’ personal reputations and preferences at the expense of shareholders (Brown, Helland, 
and Smith 2006; Masulis and Reza 2015; Cheng, Hong, and Shue 2016). For example, Masulis 
and Reza (2015) offer evidence that CEO charity preferences (i.e., CEO’s personal affiliation 
with the grant-receiving nonprofit organization) are positively associated with corporate 
philanthropy. Other than Masulis and Reza (2015), existing empirical work omits the role that 
executives’ personal attributes and/or behavior play in explaining corporate philanthropy. The 
empirical results and the behavioral explanation put forth in this study are novel to the literature. 
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The evidence that executives use corporate resources to account for their misbehavior supports 
the agency view of CSR activities.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 
Corporate philanthropy is a prosocial behavior that supports the welfare of others.8 
Although philanthropy arises in many different forms, including cash donations, in-kind gifts 
(e.g., land, equipment, products, facilities, etc.), and volunteer services, data from the Foundation 
Center suggest that nearly all (99.9 percent) corporate donations to philanthropic activities in 
2016 were in either cash or in-kind donations. This percentage has not fluctuated much since 
2003 (the first year for which the Foundation Center’s data is available online). 
Corporations often support philanthropic activities through one of two potential channels: 
(1) corporate-sponsored foundations, and (2) corporate giving programs. In the first channel, 
corporations contribute cash, goods, and/or services to their own sponsored foundations, which 
then donate the contributed resources to external recipients. In the second channel, corporations 
contribute resources directly to recipients. Thus, the main difference between the two channels is 
that corporate-sponsored foundations involve a separate legal entity, while corporate giving 
programs are generally in-house functions. Nevertheless, data from the Foundation Center 
suggests that 98.5 percent of corporate donations in 2016 were from corporate-sponsored 
foundations (i.e., the first channel).9 Figure 1 illustrates the two channels linking corporations to 
external recipients. 
While some critics argue that “the social responsibility of business is to increase its 
profit” (Friedman 1970), prior research considers three different reasons for corporate 
 
8 See “What is Corporate Philanthropy,” Double the Donation, 
https://doublethedonation.com/tips/corporatephilanthropy.  
9 For more statistics on both the form and channel of corporate philanthropy, see “Foundation Data,” 
FOUNDATION CENTER, https://foundationcenter.org/gain-knowledge/foundation-data.  
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philanthropic activities. The first reason, referred to as “doing well by doing good,” views 
corporate philanthropy as a shareholder value maximizing activity (Navarro 1988; Benabou and 
Tirole 2010). For example, firms may use philanthropic activities to generate goodwill and build 
a loyal customer base. The second reason is called “delegated philanthropy” (Benabou and Tirole 
2010). With this view, consumers and shareholders face information and transaction costs with 
directing their individual resources to charitable organizations; thus, they delegate their own 
philanthropic support and activities to the corporation. The third reason regards corporate 
philanthropy as the manifestation of an agency problem between a firm’s management and its 
shareholders. That is, corporate philanthropy potentially serves to promote managers’ personal 
reputations and preferences at the expense of shareholders (Boatsman and Gupta 1996; Brown et 
al. 2006; Masulis and Reza 2015; Cheng et al. 2016). Much of prior research focuses on this 
agency view of corporate philanthropy. 
For instance, regarding whether managers, in general, have much influence over 
corporate philanthropy, prior studies find that executives exercise rather significant influence on 
the size and the selection of beneficiary of donations from both corporate-sponsored foundations 
and corporate giving programs (Harris and Klepper 1976; Kahn 1996; Masulis and Reza 2015). 
Even when corporate executives are absent on the governing board, executives still influence the 
philanthropic activities of their corporate-sponsored foundations (Werbel and Carter 2002). 
Focusing on specific manager-level factors, prior research also shows that managers’ materialism 
(i.e., tendency to own luxury goods, such as expensive cars and boats) and insider-ownership are 
associated with CSR, which is generally viewed to encompass corporate philanthropy and other 
behaviors that enhance social objectives (Benabou and Tirole 2010). I contribute to the literature 
12 
 
on corporate philanthropy by introducing novel, plausible explanations for the potential relation 
between corporate philanthropy and executive-level personal tax aggressiveness. 
 
2.2 PERSONAL TAX AGGRESSIVENESS 
Tax avoidance refers to the reduction of explicit taxes (i.e., taxes paid to tax authorities) 
(Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Hanlon, Maydew, and Shevlin 2014). As a result, it represents a 
continuum of tax planning strategies, where relatively benign strategies lie at one end and 
aggressive or even illegal strategies lie at the opposing end (Lisowsky et al. 2013). When tax 
planning strategies are chosen from a set of legally permitted alternatives after weighing tax and 
non-tax factors, tax avoidance is not likely to be controversial. However, controversy can arise 
when tax planning strategies are aggressive, which is defined as having “weak legal support” 
(Lisowsky et al. 2013, 590) that “push the envelope of tax law” (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, 
137; Donohoe 2015). 
Tax aggressiveness, among corporations and individuals, is a topic of interest to the 
public, government, and academics. The interest is generally based on the idea that it “affects 
both the resource cost of raising taxes and the distribution of the tax burden—the bread-and-
butter concerns of public economics” (Slemrod 2018). In other words, even if not outright 
illegal, tax aggressiveness directly erodes federal revenue, which relies on corporate and 
individual tax payments.10 Thus, limiting aggressive tax planning “technologies” can reduce the 
amount of government resources allocated for tax compliance programs, help restore the public’s 
 




perception of tax inequity, and generate tax revenue to fund government programs, such as those 
focused on health care and education (Slemrod 2018).11 
While some level of tax aggressiveness may be acceptable to an individual who has 
idiosyncratic expectation/belief about the probability of detection from the taxing authority or 
about the efficiency of the tax system, tax aggressiveness can also violate social norms. In an 
environment where the public desires both horizontal equity (i.e., individuals with similar wage 
and assets pay similar amount of taxes) and vertical equity (i.e., individuals in different locations 
of the income/wealth distribution pay different amount of taxes) in taxation, tax aggressiveness 
falls short of public desire by shifting the burden of financing government revenue to those who 
are not aggressive with their tax planning strategies. In prior literature, such public desire for tax 
equity is referred to as “tax morale,” or social norm for tax equity. Prior studies examine both the 
presence and effect of social norm for tax equity (Davis, Hecht, and Perkins 2003; Luttmer and 
Singhal 2014; DeBacker, Heim, and Tran 2015; Dwenger, Kleven, Rasul, and Rincke 2016). For 
example, recent work by Dwenger and Treber (2018) show that public shaming of outstanding 
tax debt help reduce underpayment of taxes, suggesting that underpayment is associated with the 
violation of a social norm. My study contributes to the literature on individual-level tax 
sheltering behavior by examining where some of the sheltered tax dollars flow to and by 




11 Existing studies on tax enforcement look at the effectiveness of different enforcement mechanisms and map out 
the variation in tax aggressiveness for the distribution of global household wealth (Slemrod, Blumenthal, and 
Christian 2001; Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, and Saez 2011; Alstadsæter, Johannesen, and Zucman 2018; 
Bergolo, Ceni, Cruces, Giaccobasso, and Perez-Truglia 2018). These studies help both policy makers and academics 
in better understanding which enforcement tools targeted at which cross-section of households provide the most 
“bang for an enforcement spending.” 
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2.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.3.1 MORAL CLEANSING 
Psychology and behavioral economics research suggest that there is a disutility associated 
with violating social norms, and that norm-violating individuals engage in “cleansing” activities 
to offset the disutility. According to Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and Baumeister et al. (1994), a 
norm is a prescribed behavior that individuals within a particular social context “should” follow. 
As a result, deviations from the prescribed behavior are often referred to as “misbehaving.” 
Because misbehaving damages one’s moral self-image and/or creates disutility, individuals often 
engage in compensatory behaviors to restore their moral self-image and to offset their disutility 
(West and Zhong 2015; Gneezy et al. 2014). These compensatory behaviors are called “moral 
cleansing” in psychology and “conscience accounting” in behavioral economics (Tetlock, 
Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner 2000; Zhong and Liljenquist 2006; Merritt, Effron, and Monin 
2010). 
I consider whether the pursuit of corporate philanthropy is a compensatory behavioral 
response to corporate executives’ personal tax aggression. The act of restoring moral self-worth 
and offsetting disutility of tax aggression by pursuing corporate philanthropy assumes that there 
exists either an internalized norm, social norm, or both for tax equity. If personal tax 
aggressiveness does not violate a corporate executive’s internalized norm or if there is no social 
norm for tax equity in the corporate executive’s environment, then I would expect the moral 
cleansing effect to be less salient. As a result, the notion of moral cleansing suggests a positive 
relation between corporate philanthropy and executive-level personal tax aggressiveness when 




2.3.2 INDIVIDUAL BELIEFS 
A growing literature in behavioral economics, finance, and accounting leverage 
psychology theories to examine how managerial beliefs or preferences affect corporate decisions 
(Joulfaian 2000; Chyz 2013; Cronqvist et al. 2012; Law and Mills 2017; Malmendier 2018). For 
example, in a merger and acquisition setting, an executive in charge of the bidding process could 
overestimate her ability to generate value from the transaction and, subsequently, overbid for a 
target (Roll 1986). In a similar manner, executives could have preferences for tax aggressiveness 
both at the individual level and corporate level giving rise to a positive association between 
executive-level personal tax aggression and corporate tax aggression (Joulfaian 2000; Chyz 
2013). I propose that the executives’ preferences for tax aggression are at least partly due to their 
beliefs about the government’s ability to efficiently distribute resources gathered through its tax 
system. Informative about how individuals’ view government expenditures, Li, Eckel, 
Grossman, and Brown (2015), in a lab experiment, find that participants voluntarily contributed 
more resources to the government when they were presented with information that their 
contributions will be directed toward government programs that support specific causes than 
when they were presented with information that their contributions will, in general, increase the 
U.S. federal revenue. Executives could view the lack of efficiency of the tax system (e.g., 
distortion of incentives; loss of transfers from the administrative costs of taxation; misdirected 
resources) as one of the rationale for deploying aggressive tax planning technologies and could 







Both moral cleansing and individual beliefs explanations predict that corporate 
philanthropy is increasing in executive-level personal tax aggression. However, there two key 
reasons why such a positive relation might not manifest. With respect to the moral cleansing 
explanation, personally tax aggressive executives can have other means through which they 
restore their moral self-worth and rid themselves of disutility. For example, Card, Hallock, and 
Moretti (2010) find that corporate headquarters location is positively associated with local 
charitable giving, which they attribute to corporate executives making personal donations to 
local charities. If personally tax aggressive executives compensate for their tax-based 
misbehavior solely through personal donations, then corporate philanthropy might not be 
sensitive to executives’ personal tax aggressiveness. With respect to the individual beliefs 
explanation, executives could simply be limited in their ability to impose their idiosyncratic 
belief on corporate-level decisions. This would be the case if corporate governance system 
surrounding the executives views corporate philanthropy primarily as a conduit for promoting 
executives’ personal reputations and preferences at the expense of shareholders. Nevertheless, on 
balance, I test the following hypothesis (in alternative form): 
H1: There is an increase in corporate philanthropy after an executive is personally tax aggressive. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
 
3.1 MEASURING PERSONAL TAX AGGRESSIVNESS 
3.1.1 STOCK OPTION EXERCISE BACKDATING 
Tests of H1 require the timely measurement of personal tax aggressiveness. Even if it 
were possible to obtain confidential IRS data on individual-level tax audits for corporate 
executives, such data may not prove fruitful. For instance, IRS audits generally transpire for 
several years and, generally speaking, there could be a long (or no) statute of limitations for 
particularly aggressive tax planning transactions. Therefore, the discovery of individual tax 
aggressiveness (through tax audits) may substantially lag the tax year of a personal tax 
aggression event, rendering only a few observable data points. I overcome such empirical 
challenges by relying on a measure of personal tax aggressiveness established and validated by 
recent research (Cicero 2009; Dhaliwal et al. 2009; Chyz 2013; Biggerstaff et al. 2015). 
A number of studies find that corporate executives backdate option exercises to make 
personal tax gains (Cicero 2009; Dhaliwal et al. 2009). Such so-called “stock option backdating” 
involves marking an option exercise transaction as if it were exercised on a date that precedes 
the actual exercise date. The economics of such tax-motivated option exercises are simple. 
Executives face immediate tax consequences when they exercise options. The spread between 
the exercise price and underlying stock price at the exercise date is taxed at ordinary income tax 
rates. Subsequently, any price appreciation of the underlying stock beginning on the exercise 
date (i.e., the date of acquisition of the underlying stocks) can be taxed at long-term capital gains 
tax rates—which is significantly lower—provided that the underlying stocks are held long 
enough (e.g., more than one year) to qualify. Since the long-term capital gains tax rate is lower 
18 
 
than the ordinary income tax rate, executives have an incentive to reduce their tax burden by 
shifting the spread between the exercise price and underlying stock price into long-term capital 
gains.12 
Reducing explicit taxes through option exercise backdating is achievable when 
executives (1) date their option exercises to days associated with low stock prices, and (2) hold 
the underlying assets until capital gains are classified as long-term (also known as, “exercise-
and-hold” transactions). The SEC requires corporate insiders to report the date of option exercise 
transactions, and this reporting requirement allows researchers to observe whether stock return 
and exercise date price patterns are consistent with executives attempting to make personal tax 
gains. If executives actively date their option exercises to days with low stock prices, researchers 
should observe the prices of underlying stocks decreasing pre-exercise dates and increasing post-
exercise dates. Figure 2 plots both cumulative total and abnormal returns in a [-30, +30] day 
window around exercise-and-hold transactions over this study’s sample period (i.e., 2003-2016). 
The cumulative return patterns in Figure 2 are consistent with executives backdating option 
exercises to make personal tax gains.13 
What are the legal implications of option exercise backdating and why is this behavior an 
aggressive tax avoidance strategy? As discussed in Fried (2008), Cicero (2009), and Dhaliwal et 
al. (2009), backdating option exercises to save personal taxes results in under-reporting of tax 
liability and, in some cases, can be considered a felony under Federal law (see IRC Sections 
7201, 7206, and 7207). Given the potential legal consequences of using option exercise 
 
12 The top marginal income tax rate for individuals fluctuated over the recent years. For example, from 2003 to 2012 
the top marginal tax rate was 35.0 percent. From 2013 to 2017, the top marginal tax rate was 39.6 percent. The top 
statutory tax rate on long-term capital gains was 15.0 percent starting in 2003, and this rate jumped to 20.0 percent 
starting in 2013. 
13 As discussed in Cicero (2009), if these exercise-and-hold transactions are timed with private information (not 




backdating to make personal tax gains and the fact that such personal tax avoidance pushes the 
envelope of the tax law, prior research views option exercise backdating as an aggressive 
personal tax avoidance strategy (Chyz 2013, 311). Anecdotally, a former CFO of Mercury 
Interactive Corp. was indicted in 2008 for charges related to income tax evasion and on aiding 
income tax evasion of other executives at Mercury Interactive Corp. An SEC, IRS, and 
shareholder-led investigation accused the CFO of evading income taxes via option exercise 
backdating, and the CFO was sentenced in 2011 to four months incarceration and ordered to pay 
$400,000 in restitution.14 
 
3.1.2 DATA ON OPTION EXERCISES 
Corporate insiders, such as officers and directors, with access to non-public, material 
information must report their insider trading activities to the SEC on Forms 3, 4, 5, and 144. 
Thomson Financial Insider Filing Database (IFD) is a machine-readable dataset that contains the 
reported insider trading activities. I focus on insider trading activities of Board Chairman, Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and 
President for the sample period beginning in fiscal year 2003 and ending in fiscal year 2016.15 I 
focus on these executives based on evidence that top management has influence in directing 
corporate philanthropy (Harris and Klepper 1976) and that some of these executives’ option 
exercises are likely backdated (Cicero 2009; Dhaliwal et al. 2009; Chyz 2013). At the transaction 
level, I follow Cicero (2009) and consider exercises by all executives within a firm on the same 
date as a single transaction. Following Chyz (2013) and Biggerstaff et al. (2015), I then 
 
14 See “Ex-Mercury CFO Gets 4 Months For Tax Evasion,” Law360, 
https://www.law360.com/articles/229277/exmercury-cfo-gets-4-months-for-tax-evasion.  
15 The sample period is restricted by the availability of FDO’s information on philanthropic activities by corporate-
sponsored foundations and corporate giving programs. 
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aggregate option exercise transactions at the firm-year level. Thus, I count all of the exercise 
transactions by executives within a firm-year as a single observation. 
As discussed in Chapter 3.1.1, option exercises that exhibit stock return patterns 
consistent with backdating the exercises to make personal tax gains (suspect exercises) fall under 
the exercise-and-hold transaction category. Thus, exercise-and-hold transactions are composed 
of “suspect” exercises and “non-suspect” exercises. To control for any common factor that drives 
executives to exercise their options and not immediately sell the underlying shares, I limit my 
sample to exercise-and-hold transactions. 
I identify exercise-and-hold transactions by merging option transactions data (Table 2 of 
Form 4) with stock transactions data (Table 1 of Form 4). For both options and stocks, I follow 
Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2010) and focus on transactions that have the following cleanse 
codes: “R” (“Data verified through the cleansing process”), “H” (“Cleansed with a very high 
level of confidence), and “C” (“A record added to non-derivative table or derivative table in 
order to correspond with a record on the opposing table”). A cleanse code is assigned to each 
insider filing observation by Thomson Reuters to indicate their confidence in data integrity. For 
each option exercise transaction coded “M”, “X”, and “J”, I look for stock sales by the same 
executive during the [-3, +3] day window around the exercise date.16 I classify option exercises 
that are not accompanied with stock sales during the [-3, +3] day window as exercise-and-hold 
transactions. This classification scheme is consistent with prior literature (e.g., Biggerstaff et al. 
2015). The rationale for using a relatively tight window for stock sales is to capture executives’ 
intention to hold the acquired shares at the exercise date. I eliminate two exercise-and-hold 
 
16 Transaction codes “M”, “X”, and “J” stand for “Exercise of in-the-money or at-the-money derivative security 
acquired pursuant to Rule 16b-3 plan”, “Exercise of in-the-money or at-the-money derivative security”, and “Other 
acquisition or disposition”, respectively. 
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transactions from the sample: (1) missing stock price information during the calendar month of 
option exercise, and (2) those outside of fiscal years from 2003 to 2016. Applying the above data 
filters, the sample consists of 934 unique firms and 1,696 firm-year observations. 
 
3.2 MEASURING CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 
For the 934 unique firms identified above, I obtain data on the philanthropic activities of 
their corporate-sponsored foundations and corporate giving programs from the Foundation 
Center. The Center’s mission is to gather grant-level information to promote efficient allocation 
of philanthropic resources. The Center’s information on corporate philanthropy is accessible 
through their online directory (referred to as FDO) for 2003-2016. As noted earlier, corporate 
philanthropy can transpire in different forms such as cash donations, in-kind gifts, and volunteer 
services. From 2003-2016, 99.9 percent of total grants (i.e., resources given by corporate-
sponsored foundation or corporate giving programs) are either cash or in-kind grants. The 
Foundation Center provides detailed information about grant-makers and their grants, including 
the identity of grant-maker, grant amount, the identity of grant-recipient, and the grant year. It 
obtains these details by (1) directly asking the grant-making corporations for the philanthropic 
activities of their giving programs, and (2) accessing public records, such as the IRS filings (e.g., 
Form 990-PF), for the philanthropic activities of corporate-sponsored foundations. To the best of 
my knowledge, FDO is the most comprehensive database for identifying corporate philanthropy. 
However, FDO does not provide a unique company identifier that can be reliably used to 
match corporate philanthropy to IFD or Compustat; thus, I hand-match the corporate 
philanthropy information on FDO to 934 firms using the Employer Identification Number (EIN) 
and company name. Figure 3 presents the level of aggregate corporate philanthropy from 2003 to 
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2016 for the sample. Corporate philanthropy (in dollars) is generally trending up, with a large 
spike in 2013. One explanation for the spike in corporate philanthropy is the Boston Marathon 
bombings on April 15th. Later, I address the potential concern that the results documented below 
could be driven by this abrupt change. 
 
3.3 EMPIRCAL MODEL 
I examine the effect of corporate executives’ personal tax aggressiveness on corporate 
philanthropy using a difference-in-differences methodology, where I compare changes in 
philanthropic activities of firms exposed vs. not-exposed to suspect option exercise events. A 
firm is exposed to a suspect exercise event if the firm’s executive(s) initiates one or more suspect 
exercises that exhibit stock return patterns around the exercises consistent with using option 
exercise backdating to make personal tax gains. A firm is in the non-exposed group if its 
executive(s) initiates one or more non-suspect exercises in the same year. The exposed and non-
exposed firms within the same year are then grouped into a single event cohort (e.g., 2013-
cohort). For each firm in the same event-cohort, I build a firm-level panel data spanning three 
years before and three years after the event. Finally, I “stack” each event cohort into a dataset. 
Using this “stacked” approach, I estimate regressions of the following type throughout my 
analyses:17 
 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑡 = 𝛽(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑡) + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑒 + 𝜔𝑡𝑒 + 𝑖𝑒𝑡, (1) 
where i, e, and t index firms, event, and year, respectively. Y is the natural log of (1+corporate 
philanthropy). Exposed is an indicator variable that equals 1 if at least one of a firm’s executives 
are reported to have initiated suspect exercises on days associated with stock prices in the bottom 
 
17 See Gormley and Matsa (2011) and Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014) for similar stacked empirical design. 
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quintile of the calendar month. Post is an indicator variable that equals 1 for three years after the 
option exercise event. X are firm-level control variables. I include firm×event-cohort fixed 
effects, γie, to control for fixed firm heterogeneity within a event-cohort. Year×event-cohort fixed 
effects, ωte, control for any time varying aggregate-level shocks within a event-cohort. The two 
fixed effects in Equation 1 absorb both Exposed and Post variables’ variation. Εiet is the error 
term. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Figure 4 shows that my exposed vs. non-exposed assignment scheme separates firms 
exposed to suspect exercise events from those not exposed to suspect exercise events. The figure 
plots cumulative total returns for both exposed and non-exposed groups. The dotted line 
represents cross-sectional average cumulative total returns for the exposed firms, and the solid 
line represents cross-sectional average cumulative total returns for the non-exposed firms. The 
sharp distinction between cumulative total return patterns for exposed and non-exposed firms 
suggests that executives in exposed firms tend to initiate suspect exercises while executives in 
non-exposed firms, on average, initiate non-suspect exercises.18 
To illustrate my empirical design, consider the following example. Suppose an executive 
at Fake Co. initiates a suspect exercise in 2010. To examine whether Fake Co.’s philanthropic 
activities are sensitive to this executive-level tax aggression, I could compare the level of Fake 
Co.’s philanthropic activities before and after 2010. If there are no concerns with respect to 
aggregate-level shocks affecting Fake Co.’s philanthropy around the same time period, the 
simple time-series difference approach would be sufficient to establish an empirical link between 
 
18 Relaxing my exposure assignment scheme to include more firms in the exposed group (assigning 1 to exposed if 
at least one of a firm’s executives is reported to have initiated suspect exercises on days associated with stock prices 
in the bottom tercile of the calendar month) does not alter my inferences. Also, restricting my exposure assignment 
scheme to include less firms in the exposed group (assigning 1 to exposed if at least one of a firm’s executives is 
reported to have initiated suspect exercises on days associated with stock prices in the bottom decile of the calendar 
month) does not alter my inferences. 
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corporate philanthropy and executive-level tax aggressiveness. However, it is possible that other 
events could have driven up the demand for corporate philanthropy in 2010. For example, an 
earthquake in Haiti transpired in 2010. To difference out such aggregate-level shocks, I include 
other firms with their executives initiating non-suspect exercises in 2010. With the control group 
in place, I examine the difference between the change in Fake Co.’s philanthropic activities and 
the change in control groups’ philanthropic activities around 2010. Since my empirical design 
accommodates multiple suspect exercise events by suspect executives, Equation 1 estimates the 
average effect of executive-level tax aggression on corporate philanthropy for all suspect 
exercise events across different firms and years. It is important to note that executives of both 
exposed and non-exposed firms are exercising their stock options in year t; therefore, any 
common incentive that drives executives to exercise options and hold the underlying securities in 
the same year is controlled for in the empirical design. 
I control for firm-year variables that might either affect corporate philanthropy or be 
correlated with both executive-level tax aggressiveness and corporate philanthropy. Navarro 
(1988) argues that corporate managers use corporate philanthropy strategically to improve 
corporate image and finds a positive correlation between advertising expenditures and corporate 
philanthropy. I include advertising expenditures as a control variable. Profitability (return on 
assets) and size-based measures (total assets and market-to-book variables) also likely influence 
corporate philanthropy. List (2011) provides some descriptive evidence consistent with the 
notion that philanthropy is procyclical.19 Also, I include leverage and cash holdings as proxies 
for free cash flow induced agency problems. Weak governance could allow executives to (1) 
take advantage of weak internal information environments to make personal tax gains, and (2) 
 
19 Using market value as an alternative size-based control variable does not alter the documented results. 
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expend corporate resources on their rent-seeking projects, such as corporate philanthropy, to 
improve their own image. I control for the cash effective tax rate, such that my results are not 
driven by suspect executives using cash donations from corporate giving programs as a strategy 
to reduce corporate tax payments (Joulfaian 2000; Chyz 2013). 
In light of Chyz’s (2013) findings on the positive relation between corporate tax 
aggressiveness and the presence of suspect executives, one could argue that corporate 
philanthropy is a mechanism through which personally tax aggressive executives achieve lower 
corporate tax payments. There is at least one reason why corporate philanthropy is not likely a 
corporate tax avoidance strategy pursued by personally tax aggressive executives. While U.S. 
corporations can deduct philanthropic donations on their tax returns and reduce tax payments, 
these philanthropic donation must originate from corporate giving programs (corporate in-house 
function) in order for the corporations to use their philanthropic activities to generate additional 
deductions.20 The Foundation Center’s data shows that the majority of corporate philanthropic 
activities are composed of those originating from corporate-sponsored foundations not from 
corporate giving programs.21 
Given that corporate-sponsored foundations are separate legal entities under the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC), it is unlikely that the predicted positive relation between corporate 
philanthropy and executive-level personal tax aggression is a mechanism for the findings in 
Chyz (2013). Despite the above reasoning, I control for the cash effective tax rate (ETR). 
Finally, I control for the incidence of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). 
 
20 U.S. corporations can deduct philanthropic donations on their tax returns, reducing tax payments. In addition, 
corporate philanthropy reduces the bottom line on financial income statements. For more information on the effect 
of corporate philanthropy on corporate tax returns, see IRS Publication 542, https://www.irs.gov/publications/p542.  
21 According to the FDO, 1,225,556 out of 1,244,535 philanthropic donations were from corporate-sponsored 
foundations in 2016. 
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Biggerstaff et al. (2015) document a positive relation between unethical behavior at executive-
level (e.g., executive-level tax aggression) and financial misconduct at firm-level (e.g., financial 
restatements). Chakravarthy, DeHaan, and Rajgopal (2014) show that firms pursue prosocial 
activities (e.g., corporate philanthropy) as a way of repairing their reputation in the post-financial 
restatement periods. Controlling for AAERs (proxy for financial misconduct at firm-level) 
mitigates the concern related to the corporate-level “reputation-rebuilding” effect driving my 
results. 
 
3.4 OTHER DATA SOURCES AND DATA FILTERS 
I obtain firm-level data on advertising expense, sales, total assets, profitability, leverage, 
market value, cash holdings, cash effective tax rate, and HHI from Compustat. These variables 
are used to construct the control variables in Equation 1. Both year and industry classifications 
follow fiscal year and SIC code reported in Compustat. AAERs are obtained from the University 
of Southern California’s Marshall School of business.22 Institutional block ownership is obtained 
from WRDS Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings file. I also obtain daily stock prices 
and returns from CRSP to (1) observe monthly stock price range (used to produce summary 
statistics below) and (2) construct cumulative total and market-adjusted returns.23 
The control variables are matched to the panel data spanning three years before and three 
years after 1,696 firm-year observations (i.e., firm-years with exercise-and-hold transactions). I 
eliminate those observations with missing control variables. Having 934 unique firms with 1,696 
firm-years associated with exercise-and-hold transactions indicates that some firms might be a 
non-exposed firm in one event-cohort and an exposed firm in another event-cohort. If a firm 
 
22 See https://www.marshall.usc.edu/departments/leventhal-school-accounting/faculty/aaer-dataset.  
23 Both cumulative total and market-adjusted returns calculations follow Kothari and Warner (2007). 
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experiences a non-suspect exercise event in year t and a suspect exercise event in year t+1, the 
firm’s non-exposed observations partially overlap with the same firm’s exposed observations. To 
ensure that a firm’s non-exposed observations are not contaminated by the same firm’s exposed 
observations, I eliminate post-option-exercise event observations whenever there is such an 
overlap. Applying the above data filters, my final exercise-and-hold sample at the firm-year level 
consists of 1,350 observations. The analysis sample, which I build by obtaining firm-year 
observations for the three years before and after the exercise-and-hold transactions, consists of 
7,750 observations. 
 
3.5 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics for executives’ 1,679 exercise-and-hold 
transactions and 1,350 observations aggregated at the firm-year level. For the calendar month in 
which exercise-and-hold transaction occurs, I calculate daily price deviation from the transaction 
date stock price (i.e., daily stock price – transaction date stock price). I then calculate the 
summary statistics for each exercise-and-hold transaction and obtain cross-sectional averages for 
1,679 exercise-and-hold transactions. The average price deviation is $0.19, and the standard 
deviation of those price deviations is $1.13. These descriptive statistics provide information on 
the average range of prices that an executive is likely to choose from for initiating suspect 
exercises. Of 1,679 transaction-level observations, 768 are classified as suspect exercises and 
911 are classified as non-suspect exercises. 
Aggregated at the firm-year level, there are 491 firm-years exposed to at least one 
executive initiating at least one suspect exercise while 859 firm-years are not exposed. The 
summary statistics for firm-year observations are pooled averages. The average amount of 
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corporate philanthropy is $0.57 million. While $0.57 million may seem immaterial when 
compared to the average size of the firms in my sample, it is a relatively large number compared 
to the average size of the philanthropic grants in 2016. Specifically, the average size of the 
philanthropic grants was between $21,300 to $21,700 from foundations with assets of more than 
$10 million.24 The natural log of total assets, on average, is 6.62 which corresponds to 
approximately $749.95 million. The mean firm-year has leverage, market-to-book, and cash 
holdings of 17 percent, 187 percent, and 20 percent of total assets, respectively. The average 
cash effective tax rate (Cash ETR) is 21 percent, and the median is 20 percent. These Cash ETR 
summary statistics are considerably lower than those reported in prior research. For example, 
Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock (2017) examine the evolution of effective tax rate 
measures from 1988 to 2012 and report 29.1 percent for the mean and 27.5 percent the median 
Cash ETR measure. Just 1 percent of the firm-years are issued AAERs. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents summary statistics for both exposed and non-exposed groups 
and reports the results of univariate t-tests comparing the mean of the control variables. Many of 
the firm-year characteristics are similar across both exposed and non-exposed groups. The only 
difference is the Cash ETR variable. The exposed firms have slightly lower Cash ETR than that 
of the non-exposed firms, and this difference is statistically significant. The economic 
significance of the difference is approximately 0.02 percent. This Cash ETR difference is 
approximately 10 percent of the average Cash ETR in the firm-year sample ((0.02/0.21)×100 = 
9.52). I include Cash ETR in Equation 1 as a covariate to control for the difference in Cash ETR 
from potentially affecting my results. 
 




Table 2 shows the breakdown of 1,350 firm-year observations by two-digit SIC (SIC2) 
industry groups. SIC2 industry groups are ordered by the size of representation in the sample, 
and industry groups that do not make up a percent of the sample is left out of Table 2. Since the 
predictions of moral cleansing theory and the mechanics of suspect exercises and corporate 
philanthropy are applicable to all SIC2 industry groups, I include all industry groups in the 
sample. Depository institutions (SIC2: 60) make up 16.15 percent of the sample. Electronic 
equipment and components (SIC2: 36) and business services (SIC2: 73) industries make up the 
next chunk of the sample. It is not clear what is driving depository institutions to represent a 
sizable portion of the exercise-and-hold transactions from 2003 to 2016. Later in the robustness 
chapter, I rerun Equation 1 after dropping depository institutions from the sample to check that 
the results are not solely driven by depository institutions. I also check that my results are robust 
to unobservable time-varying industry level factors in the analyses presented below. Thus, if the 
concern is with depository-institution industry designation being correlated with an omitted 
variable, controlling for industry-year fixed effects should help mitigate the concern.
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 HYPOTHESIS TEST 
Figure 5 provides graphical/non-parametric evidence as to whether corporate 
philanthropy is increasing in executive-level personal tax aggression. To construct the graphical 
evidence, I create a binned scatter plot where I residualize the log of (1+corporate philanthropy) 
with firm×event-cohort indicators and plot the mean of this residual variable in each [-3, +3] 
window surrounding the option exercise/executive-level tax aggression events. Figure 5 shows a 
clear structural break in corporate philanthropy for firms that are exposed to suspect exercises, 
whereas corporate philanthropy for firms that are not exposed to suspect exercises remain flat 
over the event window. To corroborate this descriptive evidence and to control for potentially 
confounding factors, I estimate Equation 1. 
Table 3 reports the results. Regression specifications in columns (1) and (2) include both 
firm×event-cohort and year×event-cohort fixed effects. This fixed effects structure controls for 
(1) time-invariant firm heterogeneity around option exercise event (i.e., three years before the 
event + the event year + three years after the event) and (2) aggregate-level shocks affecting all 
firm-year observations during the seven years surrounding an event-cohort. Column (1) shows 
results without the observable firm-year control variables. The coefficient on the difference-in-
differences estimator in column (1) is 0.027 and statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. Since 
the dependent variable in Table 3 is logged, the coefficients of interest can be interpreted as the 
semi-elasticity of corporate philanthropy with respect to suspect exercise event. In terms of 
economic significance, corporate philanthropy increases by a 2.7 percent on average after 
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suspect exercise events, relative to control firms that are not exposed to suspect exercises in the 
same year. 
In column (2), I investigate whether column (1)’s finding is robust to controlling for 
observable firm-year variables. The results in column (2) are qualitatively similar to those found 
in column (1). The economic significance remains virtually unchanged from column (1)’s 
finding. Overall, column (1)’s main finding is not sensitive to the inclusion of controls. Given 
that the control variables are well matched between the exposed and non-exposed groups in the 
years of exercise-and-hold transactions, the role of control variables in column (2)’s specification 
is not surprising. 
In column (3) and (4), instead of year×event-cohort fixed effects I include 
industry×year×event-cohort fixed effects. This altered fixed effects structure identifies the 
positive association between corporate philanthropy and executive-level personal tax aggression 
within the same industry and year, differencing out unobserved time-varying industry-level 
shocks for each event-cohort. Intuitively, this methodology helps eliminate concerns related to 
time-varying cross-industry differences driving the results documented in columns (1) and (2). In 
column (3), the coefficient on the difference-in-differences estimator is 0.030 and statistically 
significant. Thus, the economic significance slightly improves under the altered fixed effects 
structure. Using the mean of corporate philanthropy variable for 7,750 firm-year observations 
(i.e., $0.73 million; untabulated), a 3.0 percent increase corresponds to $21,900 increase in 
corporate philanthropy. Comparing this dollar amount to the sample mean of firm size (i.e., 
$749.95 million) may seem to suggest that the economic significance of findings is immaterial. 
However, compared to the average size of the philanthropic grants (i.e., between $21,300 and 
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$21,700) by foundations with assets of more than $10 million in 2016 as noted above, the dollar 
estimate (i.e., $21,900) is economically significant. 
In column (4), I investigate the extensive margin response of corporate philanthropy and 
fail to document a statistically significant extensive margin effect of executive-level personal tax 
aggression. Overall, Table 3 documents the predicted positive association between corporate 
philanthropy and executive-level personal tax aggression under both moral cleansing and 
individual beliefs explanations and shows that the positive association is mainly driven by the 
increase in philanthropic activities by firms that had ongoing philanthropic practices. 
 
4.2 TEST OF MORAL CLEANSING VERSUS INDIVIDUAL BELIEFS EXPLANATION 
To investigate whether the results reported in Table 3 reflect moral cleansing or 
individual beliefs, I consider the heterogeneity in the effect of corporate executives’ personal tax 
aggressiveness on corporate philanthropy. Specifically, I use the number of executives initiating 
suspect exercises at the same firm in the same year as a proxy for a firm-level social norm and 
test whether the effect of executive-level personal tax aggression on corporate philanthropy 
varies with the firm-level norm. The idea behind using a firm-level norm is as follows: Under 
moral cleansing, violating either an individual’s internalized norm or widely accepted social 
norm (i.e., misbehaving) creates disutility. It is disutility that drives the hypothesized “cleansing” 
behavior: corporate philanthropy. Since an individual’s disutility is tied to norms in her 
environment, the presence of multiple executives within the same firm engaging in suspect 
exercises should decrease each executive’s moral burden from misbehaving. On the other hand, 
under individual beliefs firm-level norm could only have a different effect on the association 
between corporate philanthropy and executive-level personal tax aggression. Specifically, as the 
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number of executives viewing tax payments as an inefficient way of funding for social objectives 
grows within in an organization, the positive relation between corporate philanthropy and 
executive-level personal tax aggression would only strengthen. 
Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman (2018) examine whether city-level norms are correlated 
with the financial misconduct of public firms located within/close to the city, and find that city-
level norms are strongly, positively correlated with the financial misconduct of firms located in 
the area. Using a similar approach, I measure firm-level norm with the number of executives 
initiating suspect exercises at the same firm in the same year. This approach of measuring firm-
level norm is based on prior literature’s findings that provide evidence on how individuals tend 
to conform their behaviors to that of others around them (Asch and Guetzkow 1951; Turner 
1991). I then estimate Equation 1 after sorting exposed firms into two categories: (1) exposed 
firms with one executive initiating suspect exercise(s) and (2) exposed firms with more than one 
executive initiating suspect exercise(s). 
The results are reported in Table 4. Column (1) includes firm×event-cohort and 
year×event-cohort fixed effects, while column (2) includes firm×event-cohort and 
industry×year×event-cohort fixed effects to difference out unobserved time-varying industry-
level shocks. In both columns, the coefficient of interest is on the Exposed×Post×One 
Personally Tax Aggressive Executive variable, and both coefficients are statistically significant at 
the p<0.05 level. Focusing on column (2)’s results, corporate philanthropy increases by a 9.4 
percent on average after suspect exercise events for firms with a single executive initiating 
suspect exercise(s). A 9.4 percent increase corresponds to $68,620 increase in corporate 
philanthropy (using the mean of corporate philanthropy of $0.73 million). However, the 
difference-in-differences estimator is statistically insignificant when there are more than one 
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personally tax aggressive executives. Overall, the findings documented in Table 4 suggest that 
the moral cleansing explanation is most descriptive of the results documented in Table 3. That is, 
executives that misbehave through personal tax aggressiveness increase their corporations’ 
philanthropic activities to reduce the disutility of misbehaving. 
 
4.3 CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY PER DOLLAR OF PERSONAL TAX GAIN 
How much is spent to offset suspect executives’ disutility? To answer this question, I 
estimate the average dollar value associated with suspect exercises following Cicero’s (2009) 
estimation procedure. Specifically, I use all suspect exercises from 2003 to 2016 and calculate 
the payoff to each suspect exercise using the difference between Equations A and B: 
 𝐴 = 𝑆1 − 𝑔(𝑆1 − 𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑) − 𝐾(1 + 𝑟) − 𝜏(𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 −𝐾)(1 + 𝑟), 
(2) 
 𝐵 = 𝑆1 − 𝑔(𝑆1 − 𝑆𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛) − 𝐾(1 + 𝑟) − 𝜏(𝑆𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 −𝐾)(1 + 𝑟), 
where Sreported is the closing stock price on the reported exercise date, and Smedian is the median 
closing stock price during the calendar month the exercise-and-hold transaction reportedly took 
place. S1 is the closing stock price a year later. G is the long-term capital gains tax rate, K is the 
strike price, r is the beginning-of-year prime rate provided by JPMorgan Chase & Co., and τ is 
the ordinary tax rate.25 The following assumptions are made to estimate the dollar value 
associated with each suspect exercise: (1) exercised option’s corresponding stocks are sold a year 
after the exercise date, (2) Smedian represents what the closing stock price would have been if it 
were not for option exercise backdating, and (3) suspect exercise is financed with debt which is 
paid back with the proceeds from selling the corresponding shares. According to the above 
estimation, the average dollar value of suspect exercises from 2003 to 2016 (i.e., 704 option 
 




exercises) is $10,893. Taking the average payoff to suspect exercises at face value and 
extrapolating it to firm-year level, every $1 of personal tax gain by a suspect executive is 
associated with $2.01 ($21,900/$10,893) of corporate resources spent on corporate philanthropy. 
 
4.4 DYNAMIC EFFECT OF EXECUTIVE-LEVEL TAX AGGRESSION 
Investigating the dynamic effect of personally tax aggressive executives is helpful for 
alleviating at least two concerns: (1) whether the exposed and non-exposed groups’ corporate 
philanthropy share parallel trends, and (2) whether executive-level misbehaving through personal 
tax aggressiveness is endogenous to either the planned level of corporate philanthropic activities 
in the future or some other preexisting, unobservable shock that is correlated with both suspect 
exercise event and corporate philanthropy. If either one of the concerns are present in the data, I 
should find the effect of executive-level personal tax aggression on corporate philanthropy in the 
pre-option exercise event years. Related to the first concern, the key assumption behind the 
interpretation of my difference-in-differences estimator, β, is that corporate philanthropy for the 
exposed and nonexposed groups would have exhibited parallel trends in the three years after 
option exercises if it were not for the suspect exercises. I examine the plausibility of this 
assumption by ensuring that both exposed and non-exposed groups’ corporate philanthropy show 
common trends in the years before the option exercise events. Since the second concern also 
requires examining the relation between exposure status and corporate philanthropy in the pre-
option exercise event years, the investigation of parallel trends assumption is informative for the 
second concern as well. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 show the dynamic effect of executive-level personal tax 
aggressiveness on corporate philanthropy. In both columns, I replace Exposed×Post dummy 
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variable in Equation 1 with a set of interactions indicating the exposure status and a full set of 
time dummies around the option exercise events. Column (1) estimates the dynamic effect with 
firm×event-cohort and year×event-cohort fixed effects structure. Column (2) estimates the 
dynamic effect with firm×event-cohort and industry×year×event-cohort fixed effects structure. 
The results documented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 suggest that the pre-trends of corporate 
philanthropy for the exposed vs. non-exposed firms do not differ, alleviating the two concerns 
about the main results documented in Tables 3 and 4. While the effect of executives’ personal 
tax aggressiveness on corporate philanthropy begins to appear in the year immediately after the 
option exercise events, the effect is both statistically and economically significant starting from 
the second year. The statistically muted effect in the first year could be due to either the 
mismatch in the accounting period (fiscal period) between corporations and their foundations, 
the time it takes for grant-making organizations (either corporate giving programs or corporate-
sponsored foundations) to vet potential grant-receiving parties, or both.26 While in-house 
corporate giving programs follow corporations’ fiscal years, corporate-sponsored foundations 
could have their own accounting calendar (potentially lagging behind corporate fiscal-year end 
month) because these foundations are separate legal entities. Furthermore, both corporate giving 
programs and corporate-sponsored foundations may intend to increase their level of donations; 
however, the approval of and outlay of resources to grant-recipients may not transpire 
immediately following the intention. 
The graphical evidence of the dynamic effect is presented in Figure 6. This figure shows 
the semi-elasticity of corporate philanthropy with respect to the exposure status over [-3, +3] 
 
26 For information on how long the grant-making process could take for corporations and their foundations, see 




window surrounding the option exercise events. The graph shows convincing evidence that 
corporate philanthropy increases in the post-option exercise event years for firms exposed to 
executive-level personal tax aggression. Finally, Figure 6 shows that the moral cleansing effect 
levels off in the third year. This leveling-off phenomenon fits the prediction of the conscience 
accounting model in Gneezy et al. (2014). The conscience accounting model formalizes the 
moral cleansing theory using Becker’s (1976) model of altruism and predicts that the disutility of 
misbehaving depreciates over time. Overall, the results in Table 5 and Figure 6 provide further 
empirical support for the moral cleansing effect. 
 
4.5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
4.5.1 HETEROGENEITY IN THE EFFECT OF PERSONAL TAX AGGRESSIVENESS 
I conduct two additional tests to examine the heterogeneity in the effect of executive-
level personal tax aggressiveness on corporate philanthropy. First, both Masulis and Reza (2015) 
and Cheng et al. (2016) find that corporate prosocial activities (e.g., corporate philanthropy) 
should be constrained by corporate insiders’ share ownership in their firms and/or corporate 
governance quality if corporate prosocial activities serve to promote managers’ personal 
reputations and preferences at the expense of shareholders (i.e., the agency view of corporate 
prosocial activities). Since pursuing corporate philanthropy to offset the disutility associated with 
aggressively obtaining tax savings is tied to the agency view of corporate philanthropy, I 
examine whether corporate governance moderates the main findings documented in Table 3. I 
proxy for corporate governance using the fraction of shares owned by institutional blockholders. 
Existing literature provides empirical evidence consistent with large shareholders playing a 
monitoring role (Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach 2011; Edmans 2014). I test the moderating 
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effect of corporate governance by estimating Equation 1 after sorting firms into: (1) firms with 
the block-ownership percentage in the pre-suspect exercise period above the sample median, and 
(2) firms with the block-ownership percentage in the pre-suspect exercise period below the 
sample median. Column (1) of Table 6 presents the results. The coefficient on the difference-in-
differences estimator is 0.059 and statistically significant when corporate governance is 
relatively weak; however, it is 0.000 and statistically insignificant when corporate governance is 
relatively strong. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that stronger corporate 
governance restricting corporate insiders’ moral cleansing behavior. 
Second, Navarro (1988) finds that corporate philanthropy is found to serve as an 
advertising tool. According to Sutton’s (1991) hypothesis, advertising, in general, is used to 
differentiate products, increase product demand, and enhance barriers to entry. Thus, corporate 
insiders could be able to better justify/rationalize their moral-cleansing led pursuit for corporate 
philanthropy to themselves and to their corporate shareholders as a product differentiation 
strategy in a highly competitive environment. I test this hypothesis by estimating Equation 1 
after sorting my sample into: (1) firms operating in two-digit SIC industries designated as having 
low concentration (HHI≤1,500) by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and (2) firms operating 
in two-digit SIC industries with 1,500<HHI. HHI is measured in the pre-suspect exercise period. 
Column (2) of Table 6 presents the results. The coefficient on the difference-in-differences 
estimator is 0.055 and statistically significant when HHI is less than or equal to 1,500; however, 
it is -0.025 and statistically significant when HHI is greater than 1,500. These results are 





4.5.2 REPUTATION MANAGEMENT AT THE CORPORATE LEVEL 
In the late 2000s, option backdating practices (i.e., backdating option grants and 
exercises) by executives came into light in the media and received considerable attention. While 
executives were the main focus of the attention in the media, it is possible that the firms 
associated with option backdating practices came under scrutiny for having low corporate 
governance quality or carrying out “bad” executive compensation practices as pointed out in the 
Wall Street Journal article, “The Perfect Payday.” Such backlash against potentially poor 
corporate governance could have also prompted the firms to manage their corporate reputation in 
anticipation of or in response to the discovery of option exercise backdating, and, as explained in 
Chapter 3.3, there is empirical evidence on firms managing their corporate reputation with a 
variety of prosocial activities (Chakravarthy et al. 2014). To test whether the positive association 
between corporate philanthropy and executive-level personal tax aggression can partly be 
explained by the reputation management motive, I re-estimate Equation 1 only for firms that are 
exposed to suspect exercises and examine the number of grants response to executive-level 
personal tax aggression. The idea is that for corporate reputation management through corporate 
philanthropy to be effective, it should be carried out through new and potentially highly 
publicized grants. Column (3) of Table 6 reports the number of grants response analysis and fails 
to show a statistically significant result.27 
 
4.5.3 MORAL LICENSING 
Existing psychology literature suggests that the hypothesized temporal relation between 
future “good” behavior and past “bad” behavior could be reversed. Specifically, the moral 
 
27 I also estimate the number of grants response specification with Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood regression; 
the conclusion remains unchanged. 
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licensing effect (not the moral cleansing effect) states that individuals likely will misbehave in 
the future if they have built sufficient reputation for being moral in the past (Merritt et al. 2010). 
In this study’s setting, corporate insiders could choose to be aggressive with personal taxes if 
they have established sufficiently prosocial/moral image under the umbrella of their firms’ 
philanthropy. If this is the case, then corporate philanthropy may not only be a consequence of 
executive-level personal tax aggressiveness but also a determinant of executive-level personal 
tax aggressiveness. I test whether the moral licensing effect is also present in the data by 
estimating the following cross-sectional regression model: 
 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑡 = 𝛽𝑃𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑒𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑒𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝑖𝑒𝑡, (3) 
where i, e, and t index firms, event, and year, respectively. SuspectExerciseEvent equals 1 for 
firm-year observations associated with suspect exercises. PEP reflects pre-suspect exercise 
philanthropy and represents one of two variables. First, PEP is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if the three-year average level of corporate philanthropic activities in the pre-exercise-and-hold 
transaction period is above the sample median. Second, PEP is the three-year average level of 
corporate philanthropic activities in the pre-exercise-and-hold transaction period deflated by total 
assets. X are firm-level control variables (same as those included in Equation 1). Ωt is year fixed 
effects. Εiet is the error term. 
Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 7 present the results from running three different 
cross-sectional specifications to test the presence of moral licensing effect. All three columns in 
Table 7 show that the intensity of corporate philanthropy in pre-suspect exercise years is not a 
determinant of corporate executive’s personal tax aggressiveness. Overall, the results in Table 7 





Table 8 checks the robustness of the main results documented in Table 3. In all of my 
empirical tests, I allow for correlation of errors within firm. Clustering standard errors at the firm 
level accommodates arbitrary (1) within-firm, time-series correlation of errors and (2) within-
firm, cross event-cohort correlation of errors. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 8, I check whether 
the clustering approach throughout my analyses are conservative by experimenting with two 
other clustering assumptions. Clustering at the firm-event-cohort level, which allows for time-
series correlation of errors for a firm’s seven-year panel around each of its exercise-and-hold 
transactions, does not alter the statistical significance of Table 3’s findings. Column (2) shows 
that absent any clustering of errors assumption, the statistical significance of the β coefficient 
remains similar. Columns (1) and (2) together confirm that the firm level clustering assumption 
deployed throughout my analyses produces conservative standard errors. 
Finally, I follow up on the discussion of (1) the sudden increase in corporate philanthropy 
in 2013 and (2) depository institutions’ relatively greater representation in the sample (i.e., 16.15 
percent of the sample). The results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 show that the main results 
are not driven by 2013 specific factor and by depository institution specific factors. Overall, the 
robustness tests, along with the main and additional tests, corroborate the moral cleansing effect 
as the explanation behind the findings documented in this study. To reject the moral cleansing 
explanation, the alternative story would need to address (1) the predicted positive relation 
between executive-level personal tax aggressiveness and corporate philanthropy over different 
suspect exercise events across different years and (2) the documented cross-sectional results. To 
the best of my knowledge, it is unclear what other theories would produce the empirical 
regularities observed in this study. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
Both corporate philanthropy and personal tax aggressiveness are topics of public interest. 
While corporate philanthropy helps funding social missions related to human services, health 
care, education, etc., personal tax aggressiveness is often viewed as an activity that reduces 
available government resources that fund similar social programs. In this paper, I show that the 
two constructs of interest are linked through a previously unexplored behavioral explanation. 
Both psychology and behavioral economics literature suggest that an individual’s future 
prosocial behavior is sensitive to her past misbehavior, a behavior violating her internalized 
norm or social norm. As an individual misbehaves, she experiences disutility, which then drives 
her to act in a prosocial manner. Such temporal relation between future “good” behavior and past 
“bad” behavior is often called the moral cleansing effect. 
I find evidence consistent with misbehaving (personally tax aggressive) corporate 
executives pursuing prosocial corporate policies (i.e., corporate philanthropy). Following the 
events representing personal tax aggression, firms with personally tax aggressive executives 
increase corporate philanthropic activities in comparison to their control firms. This sensitivity of 
corporate philanthropy with respect to corporate executives’ personal tax aggressiveness is 
dependent on social norm at executives’ respective firms. When more than one executive at the 
same firm is personally tax aggressive, the moral cleansing effect disappears. That is, when a 
culture (or peers) within an organization seems to accommodate “bad” behavior, the documented 
empirical evidence is consistent with misbehaving executives not experiencing disutility. 
Overall, the findings presented in this paper suggest that corporate executives give back to 
society using shareholder resources while taking resources away from the government to make 
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personal tax gains. This paper provides an interesting partial effect that could transpire as the 
intensity of tax enforcement increases. Nonprofit organizations could lose some of their grants if 






FIGURE 1. The figure shows the two different channels through which corporations can engage 
in corporate philanthropy. Corporations can either (1) make endowments/contribute resources 
(e.g., cash) to their foundations and, subsequently, these corporate-sponsored foundations may 
donate cash or other goods to recipients or (2) directly make donations with cash, other goods, or 





FIGURE 2. Cumulative total/abnormal stock returns around option exercises in the sample 
(exercise-and-hold transactions). The figure plots cross-sectional average cumulative total and 
abnormal stock returns in [-30, +30] window surrounding the exercise-and-hold transactions for 
the sample period (i.e., 2003-2016). A stock option exercise is classified as exercise-and-hold 
transaction if stock disposition does not follow during the [-3, +3] day window around the stock 






FIGURE 3. Corporate philanthropy from 2003 to 2016 for 934 unique firms in the sample. The 
data is sourced from Foundation Center’s Foundation Directory Online (FDO). The sample 
period is limited from 2003 to 2016 because the information on corporate philanthropy is only 
available from 2003 to 2016 on the Foundation Center’s online directory. There is a spike in the 
level of corporate philanthropy in 2013. It is possible that either natural disaster or an act of 
terrorism drove the level of corporate philanthropy up in 2013. For instance, the Boston 
Marathon bombings transpired on April 15th of 2013. In Chapter 4.6, I address the potential 





FIGURE 4. Cumulative total stock returns around option exercises for firms classified as 
exposed and non-exposed. Exposed firms are firms with executives whose option exercises 
transpire when the options’ underlying stock prices are ranked in the bottom quintile of the 
calendar month price range. A firm is considered as a non-exposed firm otherwise. The figure 
plots cumulative total stock returns in [-30, +30] window surrounding the option exercises for 





FIGURE 5. Residualized log of (1+corporate philanthropy) over [-3, +3] window surrounding 
the option exercise/executive-level tax aggression events. To construct this binned scatter plot, I 
residualize the log of (1+corporate philanthropy) with firm×event-cohort indicators and plot the 
mean of this residual variable in each [-3, +3] window surrounding the option 
exercise/executive-level tax aggression events. The solid line in blue and dashed line in red show 
the best linear fit estimated for (1) firms not exposed to suspect exercises and (2) firms exposed 





FIGURE 6. The estimated dynamic effect of corporate executives’ personal tax aggressiveness 
on Ln(1+corporate philanthropy). The figure plots the difference between the semi-elasticity of 
corporate philanthropy with respect to corporate executives’ option exercises between exposed 






TABLE 1. This table presents summary statistics for (1) transaction-level option observations 
(the cross-sectional averages of time-series mean, standard deviation, minimum, median, and 
maximum of daily price deviation from the transaction date stock price (i.e., daily stock price – 
transaction date stock price)) and (2) firm-year observations. All scaled variables are winsorized 
at the top and bottom 1%. For the firm-year characteristics comparison, the difference in group 
means are tested using t-tests. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A  Full Sample [2003-2016] 
 N Mean Std Dev Min 50th Max 
Transaction-level Observations       
Monthly Price Deviation 1,679 0.19 1.13 −1.62 0.16 2.14 
Suspect Exercises 768      
Non-suspect Exercises 911      
Firm-year Observations       
Total 1,350      
With suspect executives 491      
With non-suspect executives 859      
Firm-year Characteristics       
Corp. Phil. [in $mil] 1,350 0.57 4.42 0.00 0.00 92.32 
Ln(1+Corp. Phil.) 1,350 0.10 0.48 0.00 0.00 4.54 
Advertising-to-Sales 1,350 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.15 
Return on Assets 1,350 0.04 0.16 −0.66 0.06 0.36 
Leverage 1,350 0.17 0.19 0.00 0.13 0.92 
Size 1,350 6.62 2.00 1.36 6.53 14.60 
Market-to-Book 1,350 1.87 1.46 0.63 1.41 8.51 
Cash Holdings 1,350 0.20 0.21 0.00 0.10 0.90 
Cash Effective Tax Rate 1,350 0.21 0.20 0.00 0.19 1.00 
AAER 1,350 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 
       
Panel B  Firm-year Characteristics Comparison 
  All Obs. [Exposed] [Non-Exposed]   
  Mean Mean Mean Diff. p-value 
Firm-year Characteristics       
Advertising-to-Sales  0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.00 0.49 
Return on Assets  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.77 
Leverage  0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.70 
Size  6.62 6.54 6.67 −0.13 0.26 
Market-to-Book  1.87 1.90 1.85 0.05 0.58 
Cash Holdings  0.20 0.21 0.19 0.01 0.28 
Cash Effective Tax Rate  0.21 0.19 0.21 −0.02* 0.08 




TABLE 2. This table presents two-digit SIC industries that make up at least one percent of the 
sample. The first column shows SIC2 industry group titles. The second column shows the SIC2 
classification. The third column shows the number of firm-years within the corresponding SIC2 
industry group. The fourth column shows the percent of firm-years in the corresponding industry 
group relative to 1,350 firm-year observations. 
 
 SIC2 No. %  SIC2 No. % 
Depository Institutions 60 218 16.15 Eating and Drinking Places 58 25 1.85 
Electronic and Electrical 
Equipment and Components 
36 134 9.93 Health Services 80 24 1.78 
Business Services 73 131 9.70 Communications 48 23 1.70 
Chemicals and Allied 
Products 
28 119 8.81 Security and Commodity 
Brokers, Dealers, Exchange 
and Services 
62 20 1.48 
Measuring, Analyzing, and 
Controlling Instruments and 
Associated Sensors and 
Accessories 
38 98 7.26 Holding and Other Investment 
Offices 
67 20 1.48 
Industrial and Commercial 
Machinery and Computer 
Equipment 
35 67 4.96 Wholesale Trade – Durable 
Goods 
50 20 1.48 
Insurance Carriers 63 37 2.74 Miscellaneous Retail 59 19 1.41 
Oil and Gas Extraction 13 33 2.44 Non-depository Credit 
Institutions 
61 16 1.19 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary 
Services 
49 32 2.37 Fabricated Metal Products 34 15 1.11 
Food and Kindred Products 20 29 2.15 Apparel, Finished Products 
from Fabrics and Similar 
Materials 
23 14 1.04 




TABLE 3. This table presents results from estimating equation (1). All scaled variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Please refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level and are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Ln(1+Corporate Philanthropy) Corp. Phil. [0,1] 
Dependent Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Exposed×Post 0.027** 0.027** 0.030** 0.004 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
Advertising-to-Sales  −0.103 −0.146 −0.122 
  (0.169) (0.366) (0.235) 
Return on Assets  0.057 0.084 0.045* 
  (0.047) (0.070) (0.023) 
Leverage  0.044 0.084*** 0.042 
  (0.027) (0.032) (0.027) 
Size  −0.007 −0.012 −0.008 
  (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) 
Market-to-Book  0.004 0.008* 0.003 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Cash Holdings  −0.019 0.008 −0.004 
  (0.027) (0.029) (0.023) 
Cash Effective Tax Rate  0.004 0.006 −0.001 
  (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) 
AAER  −0.039 −0.020 −0.004 
  (0.036) (0.046) (0.031) 
     
Firm×Event FEs Y Y Y Y 
Year×Event FEs Y Y N N 
Industry×Year×Event FEs N N Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.853 0.853 0.850 0.657 




TABLE 4. This table reports results estimating equation (1) after condition Exposed×Post 
variable on One Personally Tax Aggressive Executive variable. One Personally Tax Aggressive 
Executive is a dummy variable that equals 1 if only one executive initiates suspect exercise(s) 
during the year. All scaled variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Please refer to 
Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the 
firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Ln(1+Corporate Philanthropy) 
Dependent Variable [1] [2] 
Exposed×Post×One Personally  0.045** 0.094** 
Tax Aggressive Executive (0.021) (0.041) 
Exposed×Post −0.013 −0.056 
 (0.018) (0.036) 
   
Firm×Event FEs Y Y 
Year×Event FEs Y N 
Industry×Year×Event FEs N Y 
Controls Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.854 0.850 




TABLE 5. This table presents results from examining the dynamic effect of executive tax 
aggressiveness. All scaled variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Please refer to 
Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the 
firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Ln(1+Corporate Philanthropy) 
Dependent Variable [1] [2] 
Suspect Exercise Event [−3 year] 0.001 −0.018 
 (0.025) (0.037) 
Suspect Exercise Event [−2 year] −0.005 −0.007 
 (0.016) (0.023) 
Suspect Exercise Event [−1 year] 0.002 0.006 
 (0.012) (0.016) 
Suspect Exercise Event [+1 year] 0.011 0.003 
 (0.016) (0.018) 
Suspect Exercise Event [+2 year] 0.039** 0.043** 
 (0.019) (0.023) 
Suspect Exercise Event [+3 year] 0.031** 0.037** 
 (0.015) (0.020) 
   
Firm×Event FEs Y Y 
Year×Event FEs Y N 
Industry×Year×Event FEs N Y 
Controls Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.853 0.850 




TABLE 6. This table presents results from investigating the heterogeneity in the effect of 
corporate executives’ personal tax aggressiveness on corporate philanthropy in columns (1) and 
(2). Column (3) shows the number of grants response to executive-level personal tax aggression. 
Low Institutional Block Ownership equals 1 if the fraction of a firm’s shares owned by 
institutional blockholders in pre-suspect exercise period is below the sample median. Low 
Concentration equals 1 if the HHI is less than or equal to 1,500. The US Department of Justice 
considers markets with HHIs greater than 1,500 either moderately concentrated 
(1,500<HHI≤,500) or highly concentrated (HHI>2,500). Num. of Grants equals the number of 
grants made per firm-year. All scaled variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Please 
refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are 
clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Ln(1+Corporate Philanthropy) Num. of Grants 
Dependent Variable [1] [2] [3] 
Exposed×Post  0.000   
 (0.014)   
Exposed×Post×Low Institutional  0.059**   
Block Ownership (0.027)   
Post×Low Institutional −0.011   
Block Ownership (0.018)   
Exposed×Post  −0.025*  
  (0.013)  
Exposed×Post×Low Concentration  0.055***  
(HHI≤1,500)  (0.020)  
Post×Low Concentration  −0.046  
(HHI≤1,500)  (0.034)  
Post   −0.198 
   (0.198) 
    
Firm×Event FEs Y Y Y 
Industry×Year×Event FEs Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.850 0.850 0.547 




TABLE 7. This table presents results from estimating equation (3). Suspect Exercise Event is 1 
for firm-year observations associated with corporate executives initiating suspect exercises. 
Suspect Exercise Event is 0 otherwise. PEP stands for pre-suspect exercise philanthropy. PEP 
variable represents two variables. First, PEP, in columns (1) and (2), is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the three-year average level of corporate philanthropy in the pre-exercise-and-hold 
transaction period is above the sample median. Second, PEP, in column (3) is the three-year 
average level of corporate philanthropy in the pre-exercise-and-hold transaction period deflated 
by total assets. The median split is determined by comparing three-year Avg.[Pre-suspect 
exercise philanthropy amount/total assets] for the cross-section of firms in the same year. All 
scaled variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Please refer to Appendix A for 
variable definitions. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Suspect Exercise Event [0,1] 
  Between Probit 
 OLS Estimator Df/dx 
 [1] [2] [3] 
Pre-suspect Exercise Philanthropy (High) −0.062 −0.072  
 (0.052) (0.051)  
Pre-suspect Exercise Philanthropy/Total Assets   8.396 
   (19.036) 
    
Year FEs Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.016 N/A 0.026 
Between R-Squared N/A 0.007 N/A 
Number of Observations 1,189 1,189 1,179 
57 
 
TABLE 8. This table presents the robustness of main results documented in Tables 3 and 4. Specifically, the table shows the 
robustness of main results to (1) different ways of clustering standard errors, (2) dropping year 2013, and (3) dropping depository 
institutions from the sample. All scaled variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Please refer to Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Ln(1+Corporate Philanthropy) 
 Clusters [Firm-Event Year] Robust Std. Err. Drop Yr[2013] Drop SIC2=60 
Dependent Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Exposed×Post 0.030** 0.030** 0.035** 0.031** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) 
     
Firm×Event FEs Y Y Y Y 
Industry×Year×Event FEs Y Y Y Y 
Control Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.850 0.857 0.850 0.841 
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Corporate philanthropy is reported in $ millions. It is obtained from Foundation 
Center’s online directory for firms identified in the exercise-and-hold sample 
between 2003 and 2016. Specifically, I collect both philanthropic grant amounts 
from both (1) corporate-sponsored foundations and (2) corporate giving 
programs. 
Num. of Grants The number of grants made per firm-year. 
Exposed Exposed variable is 1 when the market value of underlying share associated 
with option exercise transaction is ranked in the bottom quintile of the option 
exercise calendar month prices. For example, if an executive exercises her stock 
option on March 3, 2013, then I obtain the underlying share’s daily prices in all 
of March (i.e., prices from March 1st to 31st) and rank these prices into 
quintiles. If the option exercise transaction date share price is in the bottom 
quintile, then Exposed equals 1. Exposed variable is 0 otherwise. 
Post Post variable is 1 for the three years following the year of option exercise 
transaction. Post variable is 0 otherwise. 
Advertising-to-Sales Advertising expenditure [XAD] divided by Sales [SALE] 
Return on Assets Pre-tax income [PI] adjusted for special items [SPI] divided by total assets [AT] 
Leverage (Current liabilities [DLC] plus long-term debt [DLTT]) divided by total assets 
[AT] 
Size Natural log of total assets [AT] 
Market-to-Book (Total assets [AT] minus (total assets [AT] minus total liabilities [LT] plus 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit [TXDITC]) plus (closing price [PRCC 
F] multiplied by common shares outstanding [CSHO]) divided by total assets 
[AT] 
Cash Holdings Cash and short-term investments [CHE] divided by total assets [AT] 
Cash Effective Tax 
Rate 





These releases are issued by the SEC “during or at the conclusion of an 
investigation against a company, an auditor, or an officer for alleged accounting 
and/or auditing misconduct” (Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan 2011). The 





The fraction of a firm’s shares owned by institutional blockholders. 
HHI The sum of firm-level squared market shares within a two-digit SIC industry in 
a given year. 
 
